

## **Constraining Non-State Armed Groups in Africa: An Analysis of Leadership and Sanctions Effectiveness in Angola**

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### **Abstract**

This article focuses on how leaders of Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) shape the effectiveness of sanctions. Causal determinants of sanctions effectiveness have been identified, including regime types, winning coalition, targeting, and vulnerability. The literature has ignored the relevance of NSAG's leadership to sanctions effectiveness. Whereas sanctions seek behavioral change on the part of a target, the agency of the target's leadership has not been emphasized. Explanations of sanctions effectiveness lack insight about the leadership style of actors who shape the policies and actions of NSAGs. Indifference to leadership style and how a leader is likely to behave under sanctions can hardly help the cause of sanctions effectiveness. The article relies on Hermann, *et al* (2001) leadership theory, and the qualitative database developed by the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC) (2014) to explore the relationship between leadership and sanctions effectiveness. The analysis found that leaders of NSAGs took binding decisions and determined the reaction of the latter to sanctions. By their actions, the leaders of the NSAG determined the protraction of violent conflicts, and failure of sanctions. To design sanctions that effectively constrain NSAGs, sanctions senders need to understand the leadership style of the former in order to determine the appropriate policy tools to adopt.

**Keywords:** Non-state actor, Sanctions, Leadership, Africa, Angola, UNITA

### **Introduction**

Targeted sanction is a tool by which senders attempt to achieve one or more of three goals; coercing, constraint, and signaling. Observers argue that sanctions hardly ever achieve their objectives, and often have little or no impact on the behavior of the target. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1985) emphasized that sanctions can achieve determined foreign policy goals. Pape (1997) questioned the position of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1985), arguing that sanctions have been successful less than 5 percent of the time, rather than 34 percent of the time. In a similar vein, it has been argued that sanctions geared at coercing targets, constraining and signaling are effective only 22 percent of the time (Biersteker, 2015).

Majority of sanctions successes since 1945 occurred in cases where the target political system was a liberal democracy (Nossal, 1999). Authoritarian regimes find it easy to resist the punitive impact by simply passing the costs of the sanctions to citizens (Pape, 1997). Where the sender and the target are adversaries, the target will be unwilling to comply with sanctions demands because compliance would signal transfer of political leverage to the sender (Drezner, 1999). It is unlikely that sanctions will become more effective in the future because modern states can resist external pressures, pervasive nationalism enables states and societies endure punishment rather than yield to sanctions, modern states can mitigate impacts of sanctions through certain techniques, and ruling elites can protect themselves and allies by shifting the costs of sanctions on opponents (Pape, 1997).

Data derived from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC) indicated that sanctions against NSAGs have been ineffective in coercing and constraining.<sup>1</sup> As shown in the table below, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed 13 sanctions regimes against NSAGs. Data from the TSC cover UN targeted sanctions applied between 1991 and 2013. The 13 cases consisted of 40 sanctions episodes. Out of the 40 episodes, sanctions were effective in coercing targets in only 4 episodes. Coercing was ineffective in 26 episodes. Sanctions to constrain did slightly better at 9 effective episodes and 25 ineffective episodes. The TSC suggests sanctions have been more effective against governments than NSAGs, arguing ‘there is some evidence of a correlation between ineffective attempts to coerce and some types of targets, particularly rebel groups, rather than government leadership’ (2013: 25).

**Table 1: NSAGs and Sanctions Effectiveness**

Actor	Sanction episode	Target	Coercing
Al Qaeda	4	Al Qaeda	Ineffective 2, N/A 2
Angola	4	UNITA	Ineffective 4
Central African Rep.	1	Non-government	Ineffective 1
Cote d’Ivoire	5	All parties/non government	Ineffective 4, <b>Effective 1</b>
Democratic Republic of Congo	4	All parties	Ineffective 3, <b>Effective 1</b>
Former Republic of Yugoslavia	2	All parties	N/A 1, outcome omitted because episode was a case of comprehensive sanction
Liberia	3	All parties/non-government	Ineffective 1, N/A 2
Libya 11	3	All parties/individual, entity	Ineffective 2, N/A 1
Rwanda	2	All parties/non-government	Ineffective 1, N/A 1
Sierra Leone	5	All parties/non-government	Ineffective 3, <b>Effective 1</b> , N/A 1
Somalia	5	All parties/non-government	Ineffective 2, <b>Effective 1</b> , N/A 2
Sudan 11	2	All parties/non-government	Ineffective 2
Taliban	2	Taliban	Ineffective 2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>41</b>		Ineffective <b>27</b> , Effective <b>4</b> , N/A <b>10</b>

Source: Data derived from the TSC (2015) database

Yet, the theoretical literature on sanctions effectiveness shows certain reluctance to examine the role leadership of NSAGs play in sanctions effectiveness. For instance, Wallenstein, Staibano and Eriksson (2003) focus on a wide range of factors that shape sanctions effectiveness but gave little thought to leadership. Although theoretical concern with the role of leadership is evident regarding sanctions on the state actor, and under what conditions they succeed, there is relatively little on the leadership of the NSAG. It is unclear how leaders

shape the trajectory of NSAGs and influence the latter's reaction to sanctions. Leadership is key ingredient for NSAG choices, including whether to protract or allow peaceful resolution of conflicts (Tiernay, 2015). Leaders of target state have been apprehended in terms of democratic and authoritarian regimes. The assumptions undergirding the conceptual terms have been applied wholesale to NSAGs, yet there are significant differences between both actors, at least in character and modus operandi.

Focusing on Jonas Savimbi of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the article explores how the predominant leader shaped the trajectory of the NSAG, and sanctions effectiveness. A major assumption of the article is that different leaders react differently to sanctions. A key issue is to understand how the leadership style of Savimbi shaped the refusal of UNITA to comply with sanctions demand. What leadership style and strategies are leaders of NSAGs likely to exhibit in the face of sanctions? Before addressing the questions in the context of the UNITA, a brief theoretical review on leadership is in order.

### **Leadership and Constraints: Theory**

The effect of sanctions on "leadership stability is conditioned by the type of authoritarian rule in the target country" (Escriba-Folch and Wright 2010: 336). Escriba-Folch and Wright argue that the effectiveness of sanctions is mediated by the type of authoritarian regime; personalist, single-party and military dictatorships. The negative impact of sanctions on sources of patronage is particularly acute in personalist dictatorship, which has limited capacity to induce alternative sources of revenue. Single-party and military regimes under sanctions experience little reduction in revenue flow. They are able to increase their revenue by manipulating the financial system. Thus, they are able to maintain clientelist networks of supporters, and increase repression in order to frustrate domestic opposition that could be galvanized by the economic downturn. In effect, Escriba-Folch and Wright conclude that sanctions are effective in destabilizing personalist dictators, but ineffective and possibly counterproductive against single-party and military dictatorships.

While theoretical concern with the role of leadership is evident regarding sanctions on the state actor, and under what conditions they succeed, there is relatively little on the leadership of the non-state group. It is unclear how leaders of non-state groups shape the trajectory of the group and influence the latter's reaction to sanctions. Leaders of the state actor have been apprehended in terms of democratic, and authoritarian (personalist, single-party and military dictatorship) regimes. The assumptions undergirding the conceptual terms have been applied wholesale to non-state actors, yet there are significant differences between both actors, at least in character and modus operandi. What leadership style and strategies are leaders of non-state armed groups likely to exhibit in the face of sanctions? How does leadership style shape protraction of conflict by the non-state armed actor and failure of sanctions?

We are confronted by the question of what factors determine whether a dominant leader would respect or challenge constraint in his/her environment. A NSAG, which rebels against a legitimate government necessarily acts against the norms and standards on which that government is based. If the objective of the group as articulated by the leader runs contrary to existing norms, democratic tenets and human rights regime, it is certain that in the effort to realize its objective the group will adopt strategies that tend to undermine existing standards (Bangerter 2011). Leaders may also decide to challenge obstacle because of what it is and is perceived to be. For instance, sanctions often tend to be against the rebel group, and perceived to be in favour of, or a ploy to protect, the government, or deny the rebel group victory over the government, the leader's only incentive would be to challenge the sanctions regime.

Moreover, a leader may decide to challenge constraints if it thinks it has a military advantage over the incumbent, or believe that the government is too weak to control its territory effectively.

Given the paucity of theoretical data on leadership of NSAGs in the context of sanctions, the article draws extensively on leadership in the field of international relations, particularly on the theoretical work of Hermann, Preston, Korany and Shaw (2001). The applicability of the work derives from its focus on the exercise of leadership by a predominant leader in regard environmental constraints and sources of motivation rather than regime types. Leaders of NSAGs, just like state leaders, contend with constraints in their environment, react one way or another to such constraints, and are motivated to act by factors either internal or external. Moreover, like the state actor in international relations, leaders of the NSAGs are engaged in international politics in several ways; they are target of sanctions, involved in internationally mediated peace negotiations, relate with international humanitarian agencies, procure weapons and/or mercenaries from third countries, and interact heavily with the diplomatic corps. Thus, the leader of the NSAG operates in an international context where S/he must deal with political constraints or sanctions and seek to realise set objectives. The leadership style of the NSAG's leader shapes the protraction of conflict, and, by implication, whether sanctions succeed or fail. While the literature on sanctions show implicit awareness of the importance of leadership, there is little attempt to explore the link between leadership and sanctions.

Leadership typologies are based on the nature-nurture contention (Hermann, *et al.*, 2001). Born leaders appear goal-driven, their leadership style rests on ideas, a problem to be resolved, a cause, and ideology. Their worldviews are shaped by their motives, attitudes, beliefs and passions. They lead on the basis of their personal standards and worldviews, and seek information, which reinforces their worldviews. The leaders value loyalty, and choose friends who share similar goals. For them, constraints are facts to be overcome. Leaders who are nurtured are situationally more responsive, and their leadership style is a function of the context in which the leader embeds. They are flexible and open-minded.<sup>ii</sup>Contextually sensitive leaders are pragmatic; public opinion and powerful actors play a role in shaping policy. Whereas the leader is goal-driven, behavior is shaped by own beliefs, passions, and attitudes. To assess a leaders` sensitivity to context, three questions are germane (1) how leaders respond to constraints in their environment. Do they respect or challenge such constraint? (2) How open are leaders to available information? Do they selectively use information? (3) What motivates leaders to take action? Are they motivated by internal or external factors? (Hermann, *et al.*, 2001).

The strategies leaders deploy to deal with political constraints and information interact to give four ways to describe leadership style; crusading, strategic, pragmatic, or opportunistic. Leaders who challenge constraints and are closed to feedbacks from the environment are least sensitive to the political context. They crusade for a policy, and act out of conviction that available information supports their position. Crusaders who have a cause to champion are motivated by the need to expand their control over resources, power, and space. They are predictable and consistent over time. The opportunists are different because they respect constraints and seek information from the environment. They give priority to information from the environment and take decision based on what significant others support. They will not act unless some sort of consensus can be built. They are motivated by the need for consensus and compromise.(Hermann, *et al.*, 2001).

The strategic leader seeks information as to how best to achieve a predetermined end. They challenge constraints but are open to information. They have an agenda but believe they must work within existing constraints. They wish to have important constituencies support their actions. They seek to achieve their goals without alienating powerful constituencies. Those who can countermand policy goals become the issue, not the issue in focus. They are motivated by the need to know and monitor those who support or are opposed to what the leaders' desire. The Opportunistic and strategic leaders are left out of the present discussion because they respect constraints whereas the focus is on leaders who challenge constraints.

### **Conceptual Clarification**

#### ***Non-State Armed Groups***

The term is used to cover non-conventional combatants, variously called insurgents, partisans, rebel groups, terrorists, guerrillas, freedom fighters, mujahadin, separatists, national liberation movements and de facto governing authorities. Shultz suggests four categories of armed groups, including insurgents, terrorists, militias, and organized criminal networks. The groups share common characteristics. First, they challenge the state's validity, and legitimacy. Second, armed groups employ violence and force in unconventional and asymmetric ways, as well as instrumentally to achieve political objectives. Third, they are secret organizations and operate clandestinely. Fourth, armed groups are not democratically based organizations. Moreover, non-state armed groups are outside of the context of the United Nation's "state-based architecture" (Policzer 2002). This architecture confers responsibilities on states, including commitments to a range of protocols, agreed action plans to address particular issues and conventions. Secondly, they are armed and use force and operate beyond state control or authorisation. Thirdly, all these groups have a recognisable political goal and are distinguishable from armed groups that pillage and are merely criminal.

#### ***Leadership***

When one individual has the power to make decisions for a non-state armed actor, the latter's standard modus operandi, and react to international intervention in its environment, or sanctions, he or she exhibits the status of the decision unit and leader. Everyone else respects that leader's manifest choices or position regardless of competing alternative viewpoints. Out of respect for the leader or fear of reprisals, views at variance to that of the leaders are never expressed in order to avoid the charge of sabotage. The single powerful leader is required to exercise authority in the face of problems confronting the state in order to be considered the authoritative decision unit.

There are several typologies of leadership most of which are ultimately based on the debate about whether leaders are born or product of their social context (Hermann, Preston, Korany and Shaw 2001). Such typologies include (1) crusader vs pragmatists, (2) ideologue vs opportunist, (3) directive vs consultative, (4) task-oriented vs relations-oriented and (5) transformational vs transactional. The first half of the 5 distinctions appears goal-driven. Presumably, the leadership style of the first half rests on ideas, problem orientation, a cause, and an ideology. The second half of the 5 binaries is situationally more responsive. The leadership style of leaders in the category is situationally mediated.

#### ***Sanctions Effectiveness***

Sanctions pursue multiple objectives, including conflict management, democracy and human rights promotion, nuclear non-proliferation, countering international terrorism, and containing violation of another state's territorial integrity (Dreyer and Luengo-Cabrera 2015). Sanctions effectiveness needs to be measured against how they fare in relation to three main goals: (1)

Coercing - the extent to which sanctions modify the target's proscribed behaviour; (2) Constraining - the extent to which sanctions limit target's ability to continue its proscribed behaviour; and (3) Signalling - extent to which target and others are stigmatized about violation of international norms.

### **Case Study: Jonas Savimbi and Sanctions**

Following independence in 1975, Angola descended into protracted civil war as the three main anti-colonial movements, Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the UNITA, and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), fought to control Luanda, the capital city of Angola. After a series of wars and peace negotiations, including the Bicesse Accord in May 1991, Angola's first nationwide elections held in September 1992. The result of the election favored the MPLA, and UNITA promptly rejected the results on allegation of electoral fraud and irregularities. UNITA remobilized its forces, and less than a month after the elections, Angola was plunged into civil war again. In reaction to UNITA's increasing violence, the UNSC imposed petroleum and arms embargo on UNITA on 15th September 1993. The aim of the sanction was to end armed conflict. Military confrontations continued between the government and UNITA forces. After numerous agreements, the Lusaka protocol of 1994 was signed, providing for a cease-fire, recognition of the election results, a timeline for incorporation, disarmament and demobilization, and the quartering of UNITA soldiers (Pereira 1994).

Sporadic fighting continued and there were accusations of violations of the cease-fire. In May 1996, the UN accused UNITA of dragging its feet on demobilization. On October 1996, Savimbi rejected the post of Vice President, which he had earlier accepted. The Government of National Unity (GNU) was inaugurated in April 1997 with Savimbi given special status as leader of the opposition. UNITA aggression continued and Savimbi started a purge against fellow leaders who joined the GNU. The SC imposed the second episode of sanctions on August 28, 1997 by Resolution 1127, which banned UNITA officials from international travels, ordered the closure of UNITA offices in foreign countries, and prohibited flights to and from UNITA-controlled areas. The third sanctions episode, SC Resolution 1173, was imposed on June 12, 1998, requiring all member states to freeze UNITA funds within their territory, and ensure that the funds are not made available to UNITA, its officials and key family members. The fourth episode of sanctions introduced diamond embargo, prohibited all official contact with UNITA's leadership, supply of mining services, motorized vehicles and other types of transportation into UNITA controlled areas. The death of Savimbi in February 2002, during a fierce gun battle between UNITA and government soldiers, brought the last Angolan war to an end. By 4th April 2002, the surviving leadership of UNITA signed a ceasefire agreement with the government (Pereira 1994).

### *Leadership Style*

Jonas Savimbi established the first anti-colonial movement with a leadership inside Angola. The hurried exit of Portugal led to fighting among the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA for control of Luanda. With the assistance of Soviet Union and Cuban military advisors and ground troops, MPLA gained control of Luanda and proclaimed Angolan independence on 11 November 1975. The US ended its support for UNITA and FNLA in December 1975. While the withdrawal of US support undermined the viability of FNLA after 1976, UNITA effectively reorganized as a vibrant movement with the support of South Africa. Savimbi adroitly adjusted the political agenda of UNITA to suit potential allies as the need arises. With external support, UNITA developed its military capability extensively in the

1980s and establish control over large swathes of Angolan rural territories in southern provinces and the Central Highlands. In the 1990s, UNITA came under UN sanctions and was confronted with the choice of either embracing peace or continuing its war against the government (Hodges 2001).

Savimbi's predominant role in the Angolan conflict underscores the importance of the individual leader (Hodges 2001). It is indicative of Savimbi's predominant leadership that he founded and led a national liberation movement with a radical view about how anti-colonial struggle should be organized and fought. Having parted ways with the FNLA, Savimbi established UNITA as a quasi-state and gave it a distinct ideology with himself as head. UNITA utilized seminal congresses and conferences of cadres as fora to discuss strategies and generate new policies, but decisions reached were those advanced by Savimbi. UNITA was not democratically inclined and tended to deploy force against those who disagreed with Savimbi's position (Pereira, 1994). He promoted a personality cult, which made UNITA synonymous with Savimbi (Heywood, 1998). Savimbi continuously chose a military solution to the conflicts in Angola. Occasionally, he agreed to peace negotiations, which terms were honored more in the breach.

Savimbi met with President dos Santos in Gabon on March 1, 1996 and agreed to form a GNU. He accepted the post of Vice President. Later, Savimbi unilaterally rejected the position, citing fears about his safety in Luanda. When against his decision, some in UNITA's leadership took up positions in the GNU, Savimbi started a purge against them. Savimbi's absolute power was backed by a fearsome security apparatus, and a culture of zero tolerance of dissent. UNITA employed tactical use of physical force against critics from within, including beating, killing and burning family members alive after witchcraft accusations. It was a deliberate policy to eliminate prominent figures seen as a potential challenge to Savimbi's indisputable authority. It was in this circumstance that Tito Chingunji, a prominent former UNITA representative to the US was detained and later killed. Throughout the 1980s, Savimbi was able to sustain his hegemony over UNITA. In early 1992, UNITA co-founder Tony Fernandes and Secretary General N'Zau Puna defected on allegation that Savimbi used his enormous power for personal aggrandizement (Heywood 1998).

#### *Leadership qualities*

How did Savimbi react to constraints? Was he open to information, and where did his motivation come from? Savimbi seems to have been a constraint challenger. Savimbi was goal-driven leader whose behavior was shaped by own beliefs, passions, and attitudes. As a result, his political priority took precedence over the political context. Savimbi rejected the 1992 national election results even after UN observers declared it free and fair, and plunged Angola in a bitter war. The UN imposed sanctions on UNITA for its refusal to accept the election results and its continuing war against the government. The sanctions included ban on arms import; military equipment and fuel in 1993, which was extended to UNITA bank accounts, foreign travel and the closing of UNITA offices abroad in 1997. In 1998, sanctions were introduced on diamond trade prohibiting the purchase of diamonds from UNITA or UNITA controlled areas. Savimbi disregarded the constraints and continued his war with the Angolan government. UNITA participated in a series of peace negotiations, but Savimbi reneged on their terms and continued his war with the Angolan government. Savimbi schemed to overcome obstacles on his way through delay tactics, including apparent unwillingness to demobilize his troops (Heywood 1998).

Some important events within UNITA sent early warning signals of danger ahead. Savimbi ignored the signals, choosing to undermine or destroy sources of negative information. Following the 1992 elections, cracks emerged within UNITA between a political unit interested in the peace process despite electoral defeat and another in favor of military campaign. The pro-peace unit, which was involved in negotiations of the Lusaka Protocol, was penalized for what UNITA considered a compromise with government. Many pro-peace members were replaced in UNITA administration by hardliners. Savimbi could not leave decisions that shaped the fate of UNITA and his own aspiration to others. The fractionalization within UNITA widened in 1997 when 70 UNITA-deputies took their seats in the National Assembly, in accordance with the election results of 1992. In 1998, UNITA members in Luanda broke away from UNITA launching a new party, UNITA *renovada* (UNITA-R). By 2001, 5 breakaway factions were recognized. High profile defection of UNITA representatives, and considerable number of deserters, failed to induce a change in Savimbi's aspiration and violent strategy. Savimbi increasingly centralized power in his person and relied on young trusted aides who supported military solution (Heywood 1998).

Savimbi was a megalomaniac who wanted power by all means. Power was not sufficient; Savimbi wanted to be president of Angola. Anything short of that was unacceptable. Savimbi declined the position of Vice president offered by the MPLA government. Later he was offered the special status of leader of opposition, and, as usual, it did not meet with his satisfaction and he spurned the offer. Savimbi was motivated by the extreme urge for power to the extent that he was willing to align with and receive support from apartheid South Africa to the chagrin of many African states. His overwhelming hunger for power urged him to discount the potential negative impacts of sanctions, withdrawal of US support and recognition of MPLA, the crack within UNITA's leadership, and the defections of important personalities in the movement. Relying instead on a militarist strategy, Savimbi hoped to ascend power by maintaining tight grips over UNITA, and subjecting large numbers of his close aides and their families to gruesome murder on the charge of witchcraft (Heywood 1998).

### **Conclusion**

Theoretical explanations of sanctions effectiveness appear biased in favor of the state and shed little light on sanctions against NSAGs. Such explanations have given little explicit attention to how leadership of targets of sanctions shape sanctions effectiveness. Leadership matters for our understanding of sanctions effectiveness because leaders make decisions, which are binding on NSAGs, chose whether to respect or disrespect sanctions, determine what information is useful, and control what values motivate the group. Savimbi made binding and irreversible decisions for UNITA, and thus acted as predominant leaders. As a result of decisions he made, war continued even in the face of ceasefires and peace agreements. In effect, leaders' decisions protracted the war in Angola, preventing realization of the purposes of sanctions.

Savimbi was motivated by deep-seated aspirations and he single-mindedly pursued the latter, giving minimal consideration to contextual constraints. Savimbi challenged UN sanctions, dismissed American withdrawal of support and recognition of MPLA. He wanted to attain political power by military force believing he had legitimate right to do so. Savimbi gave little attention to contrary opinions, views and values in his environment. He took severe actions against those who criticized or disagreed with his position. Averse to any challenge to his authority, Savimbi alienated his close aides who negotiated the Lusaka Accord, and mounted a purge against those who joined the GNU.



The implication of the finding for those who impose sanctions is that there is a need to understand the leadership style of NSAGs. Occasionally, Savimbi behaved in ways that reflected respect for constraint, including acceptance of ceasefires, and peace agreements. Leadership enacted at such moments could be described as pragmatic, or opportunistic rather than crusading. Such behaviors were episodic and took place within a more dominant crusader style. While his leadership style can be argued to have been admixture of the various styles, the point is that the overall leadership style was closer to the crusader style than it was to any other. On the basis of accurate leadership profile of the NSAG, policymakers can determine what is achievable and design sanctions accordingly. Set on attaining power, the crusader style of Savimbi consistently opposed sanctions demand for a change in violent behaviour. It is instructive that UNITA embraced peace only after the death of its leader, Savimbi.

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## Notes

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<sup>i</sup>The term NSAGs cover a range of non-conventional combatants, including insurgents, rebel groups, terrorists, guerrillas, freedom fighters, mujahadin, separatists, and national liberation movements. For the purpose at hand, however, NSAGs refer to groups that are (i) willing and capable of employing violence in pursuit of state power, (ii) disembedded from formal state institutions such as the regular armies, and (iii) enjoy some level of autonomy, and, (iv) undertake military offensive to seize the state. The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section two briefly reviews the literature on UN sanctions, while section three considers a framework for understanding leadership. Section four tests the framework against leadership in the contexts of the RUF and UNITA in an attempt to understand what leadership styles were exhibited and how they shaped sanctions effectiveness. Section five is the conclusion.

<sup>ii</sup>This section draws extensively on Hermann, et al (2001) formulation on leadership styles within the state for good reasons. First, the authors hold that the model is applicable to non-state settings, second, there is a dearth of writing on leadership in NSAGs, and thirdly, the difference between the state and NSAG is not the leadership styles but the context in which leadership is enacted. Human beings exercise varying leadership attributes regardless of what group they belong. The state and NSAG provides two very different contexts for exercise of leadership. For instance, the crusader in the state and NSAG are motivated by strong beliefs and passions, they disrespect obstacles, and are closed to information. However, the state crusader exercises those attributes within a context constrained by international norms while the NSAG crusader exhibits them in a stateless space where the laws of the state are non-existent. Illegal unconstitutional methods are the only known viable means to achieving the goal of the NSAG crusader. While crusader leadership style is a way of life for the NSAG's leader as he seeks to control and determine all aspects of the NSAG, the state crusader leadership style reflects the leader's passion about particular foreign policy issue of interest.